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TOWARD UNDERSTANDING UNLAWFUL 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 
.Diane Vaughan* 
The emergence and growth of regulatory agencies charged with 
controlling organizational misconduct has been so widespread that 
the monitoring and regulation of corporate interactions has itself be-
come "big business," with the complexity of the regulatory agencies 
at times matching or even exceeding that of the organizations they 
regulate. The effectiveness of these efforts to control unlawful 
organizational behavior has been assessed in many different ways. 
The records of agency investigations, administrative hearings, and 
judicial proceedings provide data on enforcement actions, court de-
crees, trials, convictions, penalties, and other indicators that allow 
empirical estimates to be made. A realistic assessment of agency ef-
forts, however, must go beyond public records and recognize that all 
social control efforts encounter natural constraints because of the 
ways in which the social structure continuously and systematically 
generates unlawful organizational behavior.I 
• Visiting Fellow, Department of Sociology, Yale University. B.A. 1973, M.A. 1974, 
Ph.D., 1979, The Ohio State University. - Ed. 
The research for this Article was conducted under grant number 2 T32 MH15123 from the 
National Institute of Mental Health. I thank Albert J. Reiss, Jr., and the post-doctoral seminar 
on the Sociology of Social Control, Kai T. Erikson and the writing seminar, and Patricia M. 
Ewick for their comments on earlier versions of these ideas. 
1. Since the early 1970s, research advances and theoretical efforts concerning the unlawful 
behavior of organizations have increasingly considered the organization as the unit of analysis 
and have recognized the importance of social structure-in explaining unlawful behavior. The 
body of work that is emerging follows the holistic model suggested by organizational theorists, 
who note the importance of studying not only the organization, but also the environment in 
which it exists. See, e.g., H. ALDRICH, ORGANIZATIONS AND ENVIRONMENTS (1979); J. PFEF-
FER & G. SALANCIK, THE EXTERNAL CONTROL OF ORGANIZATIONS (1978); Emery & Trist, 
The Causal Texture of Organizational Environments, 18 HUMAN REL. 21 (1965); Evan, The 
Organization-Set: Toward a Theory of Interorganizational Relations, in APPROACHES TO OR-
GANIZATIONAL DESIGN 173 (J. Thompson ed. 1966). Theoretical development is occurring, 
(see, e.g., CORPORATE AND GOVERNMENTAL DEVIANCE (M. Ermann & R. Lundman eds. 
1978); Schrager & Short, Toward a Sociology of Organizational Crime, 25 Soc. PROB. 407 
(1978)), but most efforts have been directed toward empirically testing selected variables that 
may predict unlawful organizational behavior: firm size, financial performance, diversifica-
tion, market power, industrial concentration, and the interdependence of industry and govern-
ment. See M. CLINARD, P. YEAGER, J. BRISSETTE, D. PETRASHEK & E. HARRIES, ILLEGAL 
CORPORATE BEHAVIOR (1979); J. PEREZ, CORPORATE CRIMINALITY (1978); Asch & Seneca, Is 
Collusion Profitable?, 58 REv. ECON. & STATISTICS 1 (1976); Staw & Szwajkowski, The Scar-
city-Mun!ficence Component of Organizational Environments and the Commission of Illegal 
Acts, 20 AD. Ser. Q. 345 (1975). An overall evaluation of these attempts to examine structural 
factors that contribute to unlawful organizational behavior would be premature. A summary 
description, however, is not out of order. Many variables suggested in the literature have not 
1377 
1378 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 80:1377 
By social structure, I mean two things. First, the stable character-
istics in American society that form the environment in which orga-
nizations conduct their business activities: sets of social relations, 
' laws, norms, groups, and institutions. Second, the stable characteris-
tics of organizations themselves: internal structure and processes. 
These factors produce tensions for organizations to attain goals un-
lawfully. Although not all organizations experiencing these tensions 
will respond with misconduct, this Article seeks to open lines of in-
quiry by presenting the relationship between structural factors .and 
unlawful behavior as a general model. While applicable to the un-
lawful behavior of organizations other than those engaged in private 
enterprise, this explication focuses on profit-seeking complex organi-
zations in the legitimate economic order because these organizations 
present the strongest example. 
I. THE STRUCTURAL IMPETUS 
The idea that the social structure generates the motivation for 
individuals to engage in deviance was suggested by Robert Merton.2 
The concepts central to his thesis are competition, economic success 
as a culturally approved goal, and erosion of norms supporting legit-
imate procedures for achieving it.3 Because Merton concluded that 
these factors differentially affect the lower class, empirical assess-
ment of his ideas has been restricted to individual behavior. But the 
concepts that he identified in many ways seem more appropriate for 
understanding rates of misconduct among organizations than among 
yet been tested, and those that have been studied exhibit wide variability in industry, viola-
tions, enforcing agency, organizational characteristics, and environmental factors examined, 
Methodological limitations have also plagued researchers: sampling is limited to enforcement 
actions, and operational definitions do not have proven construct validity. Because of these 
complicating factors, findings are noncomparable. Nevertheless, one fact is clear: Sociologists 
are creating the tools necessary for understanding the unlawful behavior of organizations as a 
macro-phenomenon. For an analysis of this trend, see Vaughan, Recent J)eve/opmenls in 
"White-Collar Crime" Theory and Research, in THE MAD, THE BAD, AND THE DJFFERl!NT! 
EssAYS IN HONOR OF SJMON DINrrz 135 (I. Barak-Glantz & C. Hu.If eds. 1981). 
2. R. MERTON, Social Structure and Anomie, in SOCIAL THEORY AND SocJAL STRUCTURE 
185 (1968). 
3. More specifically, Merton suggested that the interplay between the cultural structure 
and the social structure plays a critical role in the production of deviance. He focused on two 
elements of the cultural structure: (1) culturally defined goals (ends) that are held out and 
accepted as legitimate objectives for all members of a society, and (2) norms that specify the 
allowable procedures (means) for attaining these objectives. When the achievement of the de-
sired goals receives strong cultural emphasis, while much less emphasis is placed on the norms 
regulating the means, these norms will tend to lose their power to regulate behavior. A state of 
anomie (normlessness) develops. Given the culturally induced motivation to succeed and the 
decreased effectiveness of norms, the pursuit of desired goals by illegitimate means may be one 
response. Id. at 186-89. 
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individuals.4 
Though organizations have many goals, economic success is im-
perative for organizational survival. In fact, organizations must seek 
profits regardless of variability in the values of a particular ~ulture.5 
Not only is economic success critical to survival in the corporate 
world, but organizational wealth is also an indicator of prestige. The 
annual puolication of Fortune's "Five Hundred"6 indicates member-
ship in the upper class of the organizational stratification system. 
How organizations are ranked within this stratification system is 
monitored through quarterly reports, earnings, dividends, and stock 
market transactions. The key to social mobility within the system is 
profit-maximization.7 
Economists disagree, however, about the primacy of profit max-
imization as a goal for business firms. Professor Scherer has summa-
rized these challenges to the profit-maximization hypothesis, 
dividing them into three categories: the effects of uncertainty, the 
complexity of organizations, and the multitude of managerial goals. 8 
The effects of uncertainty may inhibit profit-maximization because 
managers lack the information necessary to formulate definite expec-
tations about future values that will shape profit-maximization deci-
sion rules.9 Organizational complexity may inhibit profit-
maximization because division of labor, hierarchy, and information 
blockages may limit the organization's ability to enforce manage-
ment choices that coincide with profit goals. Finally, organizations 
may choose to pursue other objectives in addition to, or instead of, 
profits -preferences for growth, stability, maximum sales, perqui-
4. The precise relationship between Merton's concepts and the ideas presented here is elab-
orated in D. VAUGHAN, ON THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF ORGANIZATIONS ch. 4 (1983) 
(forthcoming). 
5. See Lemert, Social Structure, Social Control and Deviation, in ANOMIE AND DEVIANT 
BEHAVIOR 57, 62-66 (M. Clinard ed. 1964) (critiquing Merton's assumption of uniform values 
for individuals). 
6. The Fortune Directory of the Largest U.S. Industrial Corporations, FORTUNE May 3, 
1982 at 258. 
1. See, e.g., M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962); Coffee, "No Soul To 
Damn: No Body To Kick'!· An Unscandalized IntJUiry into the Problem of Corporate Punish-
ment, 19 MICH. L. REv. 386,395 (1981) (''the economist assumes that firms universally seek to 
maximize profits"). · 
8. F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND EcONOMIC PERFORMANCE 29-37 
(2d ed. 1980). 
9. Herbert Sinton has argued that because the firm lacks perfect knowledge, it must ex-
amine alternative strategies sequentially. See R. CYERT & J. MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY 
OF THE FIRM 10 (1963). The process is largely environmentally conditioned - the most obvi-
ous or available alternatives are examined first, and managers may end their search when they 
obtain a satisfactory answer that meets their basic criteria. See J. MARcH & H. SIMON, ORGA-
NIZATIONS 113-17, 138-42, 169-71 (1958). 
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sites, or the proliferation of management itself.10 Because other goals 
may constrain decision-making, organizations may "satisfice," or de-
cide to obtain a minimum level of profits, share of the market, or 
level of sales. 11 
These alternative speculations concerning the competition for 
profits, however, do not seriously undermine the primacy of profit 
maximization. After reviewing the available evidence, Scherer 
concluded: 
When forced into the trenches on the question of whether firms maxi-
mize profits, economists resort to the ultimate weapon in their arsenal: 
a variant of Darwin's natural selection theory. Over the long pull, 
there is one simple criterion for the survival of a business enterprise: 
Profits must be nonnegative. No matter how strongly managers prefer 
to pursue other objectives, and no matter how difficult it is to find 
profit-maximizing strategies in a world of uncertainty and high infor-
mation costs, failure to satisfy this criterion means ultimately that a 
firm will disappear from the economic scene. Profit-maximization is 
therefore promoted in two ways. First, firms departing too far from the 
optimum, either deliberately or by mistake, will disappear. Only those 
that do conform, knowingly or unknowingly, will survive. If the pro-
cess of economic selection is allowed to continue long enough, the only 
survivors will be firms that did a tolerably good job of profit maximiza-
tion. The economic environment adopts the profit-maximizers and 
discards the rest. Second, knowledge that only the fit will survive pro-
vides a potential incentive for all firms to adapt their behavior in 
profit-maximizing directions, learning whatever skills they need and 
emulating organizations that succeed in the survival game.12 
While firms may seek power, prestige, or a myriad of other goals, 
they must obtain the economic resources necessary for continued op-
eration. This Article will, therefore, take as valid the assumption 
that profit-maximization (the adjustment of output in the face of 
market conditions so that the firm can maximize revenues over costs) 
is a motivating goal and a central activity of complex organizations. 
Financial success is a goal held out to be attained by all, but 
profit-seeking organizations must compete to attain it. 13 They com-
pete not only for economic goals, but ·a1so for the resources that pro-
mote achievement of economic ends: personnel recruitment, product 
development, land acquisition, advertising space, and sales territory. 
10. See Kamerschen, The Economic Effects of Monopoly: A Lawyer's Guide to Antitrust 
Economics, in ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST LAW 20, 28-32 (f. Calvani & Siegfried 
eds. 1979). 
11. The classic works on "satisficing" behavior are J. MARCH & H. SIMON, supra note 9, 
and R. CYERT & J. MARCH, supra note 9. For an account of profit satisficing, see Coffee, supra 
.note 7, at 395-96. 
12. _F. SCHERER, supra note 8, at 38. 
13. q: R. MERTON, supra note 2, at 188 (discussing competition between individuals). 
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An organization's ability to obtain requisite resources may be con-
strained by the source, nature, and abundance of the resource, by the 
behavior of other organizations in the environment in the roles of 
consumers, suppliers, competitors, and controllers, 14 by individuals 
in the role of consumers, 15 and by the resources already possessed by 
the organization and preexisting demands on those resources. As a 
result, attainment of economic goals may be obstructed in two ways. 
First, an organization may be entirely excluded from the competition 
(e.g., market entry is prohibited by controllers; resources are un-
available to devote to product development). Second, an organiza-
tion might gain entry to the competition, but remain unable to attain 
its economic goals because supplies of the resources that represent 
the goals (e.g., government contracts, customers for a particular 
product) are limited. Profit-seeking organizations, therefore, must 
compete for both economic goals and the means to those goals. The 
availability of both can be limited, moreover, not only by insufficient 
supply, but also by the inability or unwillingness to obtain a com-
modity at a given price. Thus, some scarcity can always exist. And 
when the scarcity of strategic resources threatens an organization 
with possible loss in legitimate competition, unlawful conduct may 
result. 
The likelihood that an organization will act unlawfully is not, of 
course, determined solely by the availability of strategic resources. 
The effect of goal variability on the competition must also be consid-
ered. All organizations must maximize returns over costs to survive, 
but the more general goal of economic success will be reflected in 
differential standards in particular organizations. Economic success 
is relative and an organization's criteria for success are shaped by 
both financial conditions and by the other organizations with which 
it must compete. Standards for economic success reflect position in 
the organizational stratification system, and may take three forms: 16 
(1) A shift in economic and social position; higher status 
competitors. 
(2) A shift in economic position; higher status among same 
competitors. 
(3) Maintenance of existing economic and social position. 
For organizations already among the elite, an upward shift in social 
14. J. PFEFFER & G. SALANCIK, supra note I, at 39-59. 
15. A. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 4, 21-54 (1970). 
16. These standards for organizational success are based on the standards that Cloward 
and Ohlin presented for individuals. See R. CLOWARD & L. OHLIN, DELINQUENCY AND OP-
PORTUNITY 94-95 (1960). 
1382 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 80:1377 
position may not be possible, though higher economic status within 
the same membership group may be. Organizations not among the 
elite may, at varying times, be concerned with all three standards for 
success. And all organizations, regardless of rank, must seek to 
maintain their existing economic and social position. To fail to 
maintain that position is to succumb to downward mobility. Conse-
quently, scarcity, combined with the differential standards for eco-
nomic success, raises the possibility of blocked access to resources 
regardless of an organization's size, wealth, age, experience, or previ-
ous record 
Economic goals vary in a second important way as well. Com-
petitive pressures and the cultural emphasis on economic success 
typically lead organizations to establish new goals once one is 
achieved. A "maximum" profit, in the literal sense, becomes an infi-
nitely receding possibility under these circumstances. Motivational 
tensions continue to operate, reinforcing the pursuit of success. 
Should a goal be attained, a new one is set, continually recreating the 
possibility of blocked access to resources and the consequent ten-
sions to attain them unlawfully. 
Unlawful conduct is most likely to be chosen as a survival strat-
egy when support diminishes for legitimate procedures for reaching 
desired goals. The erosion of normative support for legitimate con-
duct among organizations has been noted in the stratification sys-
tems of societies that become modernized. 17 The importance of 
family lineage as the basis of rank declines, while the rankings of 
organizations relative to one another become increasingly important. 
Organizational membership becomes an indicator of individual 
prestige. In this way, individuals' mobility becomes linked to im-
proving the position of their organization relative to other organiza-
tions. In a society that is not experiencing major structural 
reorganization, the norms governing competition for rank among or-
ganizations usually obtain consensus. When modernization is un-
derway, however, the established stratification principles are 
inappropriate. The units to be ranked are organizations, not fami-
lies, and the ranking process is further complicated by the rapid mul-. 
tiplication of organizations. Consensus is absent on the ranks of 
organizations and how the ranks may legitimately be improved. 
New organizations, moreover, tend to be led by new leaders, who 
did not previously occupy elite positions. Because of youth and 
17. See Stinchcombe, Social Structure and Organizations, in HANDBOOK OF 0ROANIZA· 
TIONS 142, 169-80 (J. March ed. 1965). 
June 1982] Undgstanding Unlawful Behavior 1383 
rapid rise to wealth and prominence, these new leaders tend to be 
"less committed to the norms of the system of stratification among 
organizations."18 Unsocialized by the old elite, their behavior is 
guided by the principle that new organizations only rise rapidly if 
they have some disrespect for traditional standards.19 In a period of 
rapid structural differentiation, "therefore, [wjhat is very generally at 
stake is the definition of what is deviant."20 Under these circum-
stances, the means of organizational competition become unlimited. 
The characteristics attributed to modernizing societies continue 
in highly modernized societies. Because some organizations cease to 
exist and others are constantly being created, the ranking of organi-
zations remains in flux. Organizational membership continues to be 
a key element defining individual prestige. Perhaps most important, 
the definition of deviance remains ambiguous,21 creating the possi-
bility of a chronic state of anomie for all organizations, regardless of 
rank in the strat!fication system. Successful achievement of organiza-
tional goals through unlawful conduct tends to reinforce the occur-
rence of this behavior, so that what the society defines as illegal may 
come to be defined in the organization as normative. Choice is not 
simply an output of structure, but a strategic input for the system as 
a whole.22 The successful become models for others in their environ-
ment who, initially less vulnerable and alienated, now no longer 
keep to the rules that they once regarded as legitimate. 23 Decisions 
to use illegitimate methods to achieve desired goals thus feed back 
into the social structure, effectively maintaining the pattern ''unless 
counteracting mechanisms of social control are called into play."24 
The "counteracting mechanisms of social control," however, op-
erate at less than maximum effectiveness because administrative 
rules and regulations and criminal and civil statutes that are directed 
18. Id at 174. 
19. Id 
20. Id at 175 (emphasis added). 
21. "On the top economic levels, the pressure toward innovation not infrequently erases 
the distinction between busin~•like strivings this side of the mores and sharp practices be-
yond the mores." R. Merton, supra note 2, at 195. See also Geis, White Collar Crime: The 
Heavy Electrical Equipment Antitrust Cases of 1961, in CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR SYSTEMS 139 (M. 
Clinard & R. Quinney eds. 1967); Kramer, Corporate Crime: An Organizational Perspective 
14 (Paper presented at the Conference on White-Collar and Economic Crime, Potsdam, N.Y., 
Feb. 7-9, 1980) (copy on file with the Michigan Law Review); CORPORATE AND GOVERNMEN· 
TAL DEVIANCE, supra note 1. 
22. Stinchcombe, Merton's Theory of Social Structure, in THE IDEA OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE 
11, 23-24 (L. Coser ed. 1975). 
23. R. Merton, Anomie, Anomia, and Social Interaction: Contexts of .Deviant Behavior in 
ANOMIE AND DEVIANT BEHAVIOR, supra note 5, at 235. 
24. Id 
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at organizational behavior do not revolve around sacred values - in 
fact, in many cases represent no values of individuals - but instead 
result from compromises reached between agencies or legislatures 
and the firms that they regulate.25 This situation arises because of 
the interdependence of controllers and controlled. Interdependence 
between two organizations means that outcomes for each are, in 
part, determined by the activities of the other. 26 The outcomes they 
reach are determined by the nature and distribution of resources be-
tween the two and the way in which the resources are used: Each has 
the potential to interfere with the other's activities.27 Both have a 
vested interest in shaping a regulatory environment that enhances 
their own survival. Hence, they act in ways that maximize use of 
their resources to meet survival goals and minimize the other's abil-
ity to interfere with goal attainment. Since the information and 
wealth possessed by organizations can create obstacles to enforce-
ment activities, agencies frequently fulfill their responsibilities 
through negotiation, internal proceedings, informal hearings, and 
mutually agreeable solutions. And business firms, similarly con-
cerned with successful operation, soften the power of agencies by 
efforts to influence law-making and as a consequence, the nature of 
enforcement, and :find equivalent gains to be had from negotiation. 
Compliance emerges as a product of the power-mediating efforts of 
both parties, as compliance demands fewer resources from both 
agencies and business firms than do adversarial activities to impose 
and thwart punitive sanctions.28 In any given case, of course, a firm 
or agency may funnel all available resources into a full-fledged ad-
versarial proceeding.29 But when this occurs, the event will take 
place in a regulat?ry environment that has developed as a result of 
25. Lemert, supra note 5, at 69. 
26. J. PFEFFER & G. SALANCIK, supra note I, at 40-54, 113-42. 
21. Id 
28. For a further explication of interdependence, with special attention to implications for 
social control, see D. VAUGHAN, supra note 4, at ch. 6. 
29. The recently settled IBM case provides one extreme example. See Gerhart, Corporate 
Giantism and Effective Antitrust Enforcement (Paper presented at the American Society of 
Criminology Annual Meetings, Philadelphia, Pa., Nov. 7-9, 1980) (on file with the Michigan 
Law Review). Gerhart notes, for example, that during the first three and a half years of trial in 
the monopoly case brought by the government against IBM, 
the government presented fifty-one witnesses (one appearing for over a month), the trial 
transcript totaled 84 thousand pages, and 211,000 pages of documents were received as 
evidence. Equally prodigious work occurred before the trial even began. The parties took 
over 1300 depositions. IBM is said to have produced over 65 million pages of documents 
for review by the government and several private plaintiffs suing IBM, and the govern-
ment produced approximately 26 million pages of documents for IBM's review, almost a 
million of which were copied by IBM. 
Id. at 5. 
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the interdependence of controllers and controlled. The institutional-
ized guidelines - laws, regulations, sanctions, and proceedings -
have been shaped by the survival interests of both. And in many 
cases, these guidelines will inhibit the efforts of agencies to restrain 
unlawful organizational behavior in spite of their skills, resources, 
and commitment to an adversarial stance. 
Unlawful behavior thus receives additional structural support, 
which aids in maintaining the pattern. The success of some organi-
zations at attaining their goals unlawfully encourages others to fol-
low the same path to success. 30 The absence of normative support 
for legitimate conduct is replaced by normative support for the ille-
gitimate, but expedient. Carried to the extreme, norm erosion might 
become so extensive within an organization or subunit of an organi-
zation that unlawful conduct to attain goals occurs regardless of re-
source scarcity. Behavior that, if viewed by society, would be 
considered unlawful may come to be considered acceptable business 
practice and nondeviant within the organization. 
As normative support for legitimate procedures for reaching or-
ganizational goals erodes, organizations motivated by the cultural 
emphasis on economic success and the need to survive, and unable 
to attain resources legitimately, may instead resort to technically ex-
pedient but unlawful behavior. Anticompetitive actions like price-
fixing and discriminatory price-cutting, theft of trade secrets, false 
advertising, and bribery and payoffs to ensure market share could 
thus be described as the victimization of one organization by another 
to obtain resources that facilitate upward mobility in the organiza-
tional stratification system.31 Similarly, organizations seeking eit~er 
a change in economic position that will bring higher status among 
similarly situated organizations, or merely to maintain their eco-
nomic position may also act unlawfully under these circumstances.32 
These concepts, of course, do not explain all unlawful organiza-
tional behavior. As presented here, they are directed toward under-
standing the unlawful activities of profit-seeking complex 
organizations in the legitimate economic order.33 The concepts fit 
30. R. Merton, supra note 23, at 235; Stinchcombe, supra note 22, at 23-24. 
31. See Levine, Empiricism in Victimological Research: A Critique, 3 VICTIMOLOGY 77, 88 
(1978). 
32. See R. CLOWARD & L. OHLIN, supra note 16, at 94-95. 
33. I suggested earlier, however, that the applicability of these concepts is not restricted to 
profit-seeking business organizations. A brief discussion at this point is worthwhile to demon-
strate how other organizations may or may not be included. Three types of complex organiza-
tions come to mind: {I) organizations designed to fail; (2) nonprofit organizations; and (3) 
organizations operating in the illegitimate economic order - organized crime. 
Organizations designed to fail: Not all organizations seek profits. Some, in fact, are 
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the activities of organizations that violate the law in pursuit of cul-
turally approved goals, broadly defined as economic success. This 
criterion excludes behavior that is not directed toward maximizing 
returns, such as violations resulting from mistakes.34 A law or regu-
lation may be violated because it is misunderstood, or because its 
existence is unknown. For other violations, such as sex discrimina-
tion in hiring, the linkage between the violation and profit-making 
remains a matter of empirical inquiry. Consider also violations that 
result from negligence. Because business firms do take risks in the 
name of profit, negligence may occur as a result of profit-seeking 
activity. If it can be determined that a firm negligently allocated re-
sources to maximize profits at the expense of proper attention to 
some task, the concepts would be relevant to the organization's be-
havior. In this and similar situations, the inability to make the nec-
essary empirical determinations may be a serious impediment. 
Nevertheless, current opinion on the link between .objectives, regard-
less of diversity, and the need for organizations to maximize returns 
designed to accumulate losses, rather than profits. The individual owner or owners receive 
benefits, while the organization is the center of transactions and losses. See Shapiro, Detecting 
illegalities: A Perspective on the Control of Securities Violations 259 (1980) (unpublished 
doctoral dissertation, Yale University). These organizations obviously do not fit a motiva-
tional scheme based on competition to acquire resources in order to survive. 
Nonprofit Organizations: Some organizations are designed to seek neither profits nor losses 
(e.g., churches, voluntary associations, government, state-supported universities, and commu-
nity self-help organizations). Regardless of their diverse goals, they must acquire resources. 
In the acquisition of resources, as well as in other activities, nonprofit organizations do engage 
in economic activity encompassing the production, exchange, distribution, and consumption of 
goods and services. While necessary resources and other activities may not themselves be 
viewed as profits or mechanisms for obtaining profits, these organizations must maximize re-
turns in order to exist. 
Organizations operating in the illegitimate economic order: The organized crime enterprise 
engages in business activities that extend into both the legitimate and illegitimate economic 
orders. See J. KWITNY, VICIOUS CIRCLES (1979). In both instances, organizational survival 
depends on the ability to maximize returns. Though the means used to seek profits may con-
sistently be illegitimate, these organizations certainly engage in competition for economic suc-
cess. The case of organized crime raises an interesting point for speculation. While the origins 
of organized crime may be attributed in part to blocked access to legitimate means, see 
Cloward, Illegitimate Means, Anomie, and .Deviant Behavior, 24 AM. Soc. Rev. 164 (1959), the 
continued use of unlawful behavior may call for a different explanation. One principle behind 
organized crime is that illegitimate means become institutionalized. Some organizations 
within the organized crime enterprise, therefore, may never find legitimate means blocked 
because once illegitimate means are institutionalized, legitimate means are abandoned. The 
continuation of unlawful behavior, then, may be better explained by blocked access to goals. 
But if one can assume that organized crime organizations are characterized by normative soli-
darity supporting use of illegitimate means to attain goals, these mechanisms may operate 
regardless of resource scarcity. 
34. Other unlawful organizational behavior that clearly does not fit within the conceptual 
scheme developed here includes conspiring to overthrow the government and the deprivation 
of members' liberty or lives by religious organizations. See Sherman, Three Models oJ Organi-
zational Corruption in Agencies oJ Social Control, 27 Soc. PROBS. 478 (1980). 
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for continued existence35 suggests that the model developed here is 
generally valid. 
While no explanation has yet been found that encompasses all 
forms of organizational misconduct, the structural factors suggested 
in this part appear to apply to many instances of unlawful organiza-
tional behavior.36 Admittedly, no single paradigm can serve as a 
tool for investigating the entire range of intriguing questions con-
cerning organizational misconduct. A psychological explanation, for 
example, may provide acceptable answers to some questions.37 
Nonetheless, thinking about organizations in terms of structural 
pressures to engage in unlawful behavior explains a good deal of 
what is known and surmised about the phenomenon in question. 
The extent to which the fit is true, though, must be verified 
empirically. 
II. OPPORTUNITIES FOR UNLAWFUL CONDUCT 
While the social structure may produce tensions for organiza-
tions to seek desired resources by illegal methods, unlawful behavior 
cannot be explained by these structural tensions alone. Opportuni-
ties must be available to obtain resources unlawfully.38 Opportuni-
ties to attain resources unlawfully but through legitimate 
me9hanisms are inherent in all complex organizations operating in 
the legitimate economic order because of the nature of organiza-
tional processes and structure. Created for the purpose of con-
ducting legitimate business activity, these same factors may also 
35. See F. SCHERER, supra note 8, at 38. For discussions of the methodologically based 
controversy on the diverse goals of organizations, see R. HALL, ORGANIZATIONS 94-96 (1972); 
Perrow, The Analysis of Goals in Complex Organizations, 26 AM. Soc. REv. 854, 859-66 (1961). 
36. See, e.g., C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS 35-69 (1975); Geis, supra note 21; Gross, 
Organizational Crime: A Theoretical Perspective, in STUDIES IN SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 55 
(N. Denzin ed. 1978); Staw & Szwajkowski, supra note 1; Vaughan, Crime Between Organiza-
tions: Implicationsfar Victimology, in WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 77 (G. Geis & E. Stotland eds. 
1980); D. VAUGHAN, supra note 4. 
37. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 7, at 393-400, for an explanation of organizational unlaw-
fulness which stresses the interrelation between psychological and siructural influences. Dis-
cussing the pressures on middle-level managers, Professor Coffee observed: 
The middle manager is acutely aware that he can be easily replaced; he knows that if he 
cannot achieve a quick fix, another manager is waiting in the wings, ea~er to assume 
operational control over a division. The results of such a structure are predictable: When 
pressure is intensified, illegal or irresponsible means become attractive to a desperate mid-
dle manager who has no recourse against a stem but myopic notion of accountability that 
looks only to the bottom line of the income statement. 
Id at 398. See E. SHORRIS, THE OPPRESSED MIDDLE: THE POLITICS OF MIDDLE MANAGE· 
MENT (1981); Getschow, Overdriven Execs: Some Middle Managers Cut Comers to Achieve 
High Corporate Goals, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 1979, at 1, col 6; Editorial, Why Managers Cheat, 
Bus. WEEK, Mar. 17, 1980, at 196. 
38. See R. CLOWARD & L. OHLIN, supra note 16. 
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promote unlawful behavior by providing normative support for ille-
gality, providing resources for carrying out illegal acts, and minimiz-
ing the risk of detection and sanctioning. As a consequence, 
organizations may respond to blocked access to desired resources by 
turning to the opportunities within their own boundaries to attain 
them unlawfully. 
Organizational characteristics have frequently been hypothesized 
to encourage unlawful organizational behavior.39 The factors ex-
amined have included firm longevity, product diversification, 
:financial performance, geographic expansion, market power, and 
size.40 What these characteristics have in common is that they are 
researchable - this information is publicly available, through 
corporate :financial statements and mandatory agency filing require-
ments. But, other organizational characteristics - processes and 
structure that are internal and, therefore, more elusive for research 
purposes - play an important role in the unlawful conduct of busi-
ness firms and may complicate the :findings concerning those factors 
that have been studied. Organizational size, for example, has been 
the most frequently investigated factor thought to be related to viola-
tions that are committed by one organization against another.41 The 
larger" the organization, it has been hypothesized, the more frequent 
the violations. The evidence, however, has been contradictory. Per-
haps a more satisfactory hypothesis is that it is not simply size per se 
that facilitates the unlawful conduct, but the complexity of the inter-
nal processes and structure that accompany increased size that ex-
plains the behavior.42 
This Part examines how structure and processes create opportu-
nities for organizations to act as offenders. Before turning to this 
topic, I want to make three points. First, these same factors create an 
arena where individuals may readily engage in misconduct that is in 
their own interests, separate and distinct from the interest of the or-
ganization. Second, the opportunities inherent in business firms not 
only create the potential for an organization to engage in unlawful 
conduct, but also promote the possibility that an organization will be 
victimized - by other organizations as well as by its own members. 
39. See, e.g., C. STONE, supra note 36; Gross, supra note 36. 
40. See, e.g., M. CLINARD & P. YEAGER, CORPORATE CRIME (1980); Perez, Corporate 
Criminality: A Study of the One-Thousand Largest Industrial Corporations in the U.S.A. 
(1978) (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Pennsylvania). 
41. See, e.g., M. CLINARD & P. YEAGER,Stlpra note 40; M. CLINARD, P. YEAGER, J. BRIS-
SETTE, D. PETRASHEK & E. HARRIEs, supra note l; Asch & Seneca, supra note l; Perez, supra 
note 40. 
42. Though not addressing organizational misconduct, R. HALL, supra note 35, at 171, also 
states that complexity may be more important than size alone in understanding organizational 
behavior. 
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Finally, although these same opportunities exist in general form for 
all organizations, the conditions and combinations of factors that do 
or do not result in unlawful behavior cannot yet be unraveled. They 
cannot, therefore, be discussed in the language of causality, but 
rather as factors that facilitate, generate, encourage, or present op-
portunities to obtain resources through unlawf~l conduct. 
A. Organizational Processes 
Processes are the dynamics of organizational life that affect indi-
vidual members. While introducing the notion of organizations as 
actors is legitimate and effectively accounts for certain actions, orga-
nizations must rely on individuals to act as their agents. To describe 
properly the behavior - lawful or unlawful - of organizations, 
therefore, we need an explanation that goes beyond the goals and 
actions of the organization to the nexus of the goals and actions of 
the organization and the goals and actions of its members.43 This 
necessity draws attention to the internal processes of organizations 
and to the normative environment that results. 
It is common knowledge that organizations selectively recruit 
new members who in many ways match those already there. But in-
dividuals come to business firms influenced by their affiliations with 
other organizations: families, churches, clubs, schools, trade unions, 
and previous employers. Because business firms depend on their 
members to attain goals, they must ensure that members' skills, 
motivations, and values are consistent with the organization's needs. 
To the extent that members subscribe to, support, and are willing 
and able to pursue organizational interests, the firm's chances for 
survival are enhanced. 
The existence of these important characteristics of members is, 
not surprisingly, rarely left to chance. As Selznick has noted, "the 
more esoteric the activities of the organization, the less it can rely on 
the general education provided by the community, and the greater 
the need for internal orientation."44 Most organizations, therefore, 
subject new recruits to education and training. Skills are taught, 
sharpened, and adjusted to meet organizational needs through both 
formal and informal mechanisms: training classes, apprenticeships, 
peer groups, and mentoring. Integral to the mechanisms operating to 
43. Coleman, Legitimate and Illegitimate Uses of Power, in THE IDEA OF SOCIAL STRUC-
TURE, supra note 22, at 221, 234-35. 
44. P. SELZNICK, THE ORGANIZATIONAL WEAPON 36 (1960). 
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develop these skills are systematic socialization processes that attune 
members ideologically to the organization's goals. 
Educational and training programs are supplemented, and per-
haps eventually superseded, by an internal reward system incorpo-
rating both remuneration. and prestige. The rewards are often 
formal, tangible, and obvious to other employees and even outsiders: 
promotion, bonuses, salary increases, profit-sharing, parking privi-
leges, expense accounts, gold watches, company cars, employee-of-
the-month awards, attractive offices, and assistants. In other cases, 
the rewards are informal and not so obvious, but are powerful incen-
tives, especially in the upper echelon, because of their long-term im-
pact on a career. Use of first names, inclusion in after-hours get-
togethers with management officials, or an invitation to play golf 
with the boss reward the employee with admission to the informal 
organization of the firm. Behavior inconsistent with organizational 
goals typically leads to negative sanctions. These, too, can be formal 
- loss of parking privileges, a lateral transfer, or a shift to a dead-
end position -· or informal - exclusion from the boss's golfing 
clique. The ultimate sanction,. of course, is a resignation or firing. 
Large organizations, moreover, tend increasingly to absorb mem-
bers, while at the same time insulating them from the outside 
world.45 Skills and language for a particular task may be so special-
ized that an employee cannot find similar work in other organiza-
tions. Members with no alternative skills are tied to the firm by 
financial dependence. Accumulated retirement benefits and delayed 
remuneration also encourage long-term commitments to organiza-
tions. Profit-sharing not only encourages long-term commitments, 
but gives the individual a stake in the system. The luster of future 
financial rewards binds members to the organization like a pair of 
golden handcuffs, securing their continued affiliation with the firm. 
And recreational activities, committee work, company cafeterias and 
corporate dining rooms, long hours, special projects, and frequent 
transfers separate an organization's members from the outside com-
munity and foster a dependence on the organization that is social, as 
well as financial. 
In these and other ways, the needs of the individual member 
eventually become linked to the organization's success. Because a 
primary criterion of individuals' status in highly modernized socie-
ties is the social status of the organizations to which they belong,46 
45. D. MARGOLIS, THE MANAGERS: CORPORATE LIFE IN AMERICA 41-66, 93-116 (1979). 
46. See Stinchcombe, supra note 17, at 164-80. 
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the individual identifies with the organization and the organization's 
goals. The organization's ability to attain desired resources affects 
the ability of members to be upwardly mobile, to improve their eco-
nomic position while remaining in the same social class, or simply to 
preserve their existing position. Because the interests of members 
and organizations coincide, employees may engage in unlawful be-
havior in the organization's behalf, using the skills, knowledge, and 
resources associated with their position to do so. 
Organizational processes, then, create an internal moral -and in-
tellectual world in which the individual identifies with the organiza-
tion and the organization's goals. The survival of one becomes 
linked to the survival of the other, and a normative environment 
evolves that, given difficulty in attaining organizational goals, en-
courages illegal behavior to attain those goals. But some finer dis-
tinctions must be made. Not all agents of an organization will act 
illegally in the organization's behalf. The nature of the response -
lawful or unlawful behavior - will be shaped by structural factors 
both internal and external to the organization.47 While organiza-
tions may experience structural tensions to violate, variation in 
subunit membership,48 position in the information system,49 and in 
rewards and punishments50 may undermine the organization's abil-
ity to unify the goals and actions of its members with its own goals 
and actions, producing either deviance or conformity to legal 
norms.51 
Subunit membership. Tensions to attain resources unlawfully dif-
ferentially affect the various parts of the organization. The subunits 
with skills and resources most relevant to profit-seeking goals are 
most likely to be affected. Because of the many and changing goals 
of organizations, the subunits affected may vary over time, and some 
may never _experience such tensions. Members of subunits not sub-
ject to these tensions will not be motivated to engage in illegal be-
havior in the organization's behalf. 
Position in the information system. Though working in a subunit 
that is experiencing tensions to act unlawfully, members without in-
formation about necessary resources and difficulties in attaining 
them will not be motivated to act illegally in the organization's be-
half. For unlawful behavior" to occur, the member's position must 
47. Stinchcombe, supra note 22, at 17-23. 
48. Id 
49. Id 
50. See Lemert, supra note 5, at 70-73; Stinchcombe, supra note 22, at 17-18. 
51. Lemert, supra note 5, at 73-75. 
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provide access to information regarding the organization's goals as 
they relate to the activities of the subunit in which the member is 
employed. The position, mor_eover, must entail some responsibility 
for goal attainment. Finally, the position must provide skills and 
resources that allow the individual to resolve the organization's 
difficulties. 52 
Rewards and punishments. Even if subunit membership and posi-
tion in the information system create tensions to engage in unlawful 
behavior in the organization's behalf, members thus situated may 
not do so. Norms and values learned through association with other 
organizations (both formal and informal) may compete with and 
contradict those learned while in the firm. 53 Should the norms be 
contradictory, members will make choices in accordance with the re-
wards and punishments accompanying the various alternatives.54 
Members will weigh the possibility of gaining rewards against the 
possibility of incurring punishment. 
As the rewards and punishments accompanying the alternatives 
vary, the patterns of individual choice will vary.55 Should the firm's 
rewards for gaining the desired resources outweigh the perceived 
costs of pursuing them unlawfully, members may commit violations 
on behalf of the organization despite competing norms. Again, posi-
tion in the information system is relevant, for information flows af-
fect the probability that rewards and punishments - both internal 
and external to the organization-will be meted out.56 The signifi-
cance of the organization's rewards and punishments, moreover, will 
vary as the individual's dependence on the firm varies. Alternative 
skills, alternative sources of income, and alternative validating social 
roles reduce financial and social dependence on the firm.57 Conse-
quently, external rewards and punishments may reduce the organi-
zation's ability to mobilize individual efforts in its behalf, despite 
processes that produce a normative environment supporting unlaw-
ful conduct. 
Although all organizations create normative environments that 
join the goals and actions of members to those of the firm, to assert 
that organizational processes produce a fertile atmosphere for ille-
52. See note 37 supra. 
53. Lemert, supra note 5, at 62-71. 
54. Id. at 70-73; Stinchcombe, supra note 22, at 17. 
55. As Lemert has noted, "(c]osts are important variables in analysis because changes in 
the costs of means can modify the order of choices, even though the 'ideal' value order of the 
individual remains constant." Lemert, supra note 5, at 63. 
56. Stinchcombe, supra note 22, at 21. 
57. P. BLAU, EXCHANGE AND POWER IN SOCIAL LIFE 119-25, 140-42 (1964). 
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gality obscures the complexity that exists. The degree to which an 
organization experiences pressures to act unlawfully varies not only 
by subunit, but within subunits, and over time. The ability and will-
ingness of members to act illegally in the organization's behalf de-
pend on the subunit in which they work, their position in the 
information system, and the weighing of rewards and punishments. 
These factors may not only ·generate lawful conduct in the face of 
organizational pressures to violate, but may generate unlawful con-
duct despite a normative environment that supports compliance with 
legal norms. It is important to recognize, therefore, that the norma-
tive environment generated by organizational processes will have a 
variable relationship to unlawful conduct, and that the problem of 
measurement remains a powerful obstacle to a complete understand-
ing of the relationship between internal environment and behavior. 
B. Organizational Structure 
The structure of complex organizations creates opportunities by 
providing many settings where unlawful behavior might occur, and 
by isolating those settings and masking organizational behavior. 
Size and the complexity that frequently accompanies size provide 
many locations in which unlawful behavior might take place. As 
organizations grow larger, specialized subunits result, each providing 
opportunities to engage in unlawful behavior on the organization's 
behalf. Not only are organizations internally diversified in ways that 
multiply the possible settings for illegality, but many organizations 
are geographically dispersed, with locations throughout the United 
States and the world, greatly expanding the number of locations in 
which unlawful behavior might occur. 
These specialized subunits compete for resources with other or.: 
ganizations and with each other.58 The need for a subunit to out-
perform other organizations, other units within the same 
organization, or even its own- previous record to secure resources 
from the parent organization may generate illegality, such as falsifi-
cation of records, or theft of trade secrets. Sµbunits' concerns about 
their own survival may or may not coincide with the interest of the 
larger organization, and if given an opportunity to exercise discre-
tion, lower-level managers will tend to act not to maximize the firm's 
58. For a dramatic example of intra-organizational competition, see Coffee, Beyond the 
Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal 
Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1135 (1977) (reporting a case where ''two wholly owned sub-
sidiaries of U.S. Steel ••. actively lobbied with regard to proposed legislation, but on opposite 
sides") ( emphasis in original). 
1394 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 80:1377 
welfare, but rather to enhance the interest of their own unit or divi-
sion. 59 In a recent book on the internal workings of General Motors, 
for example, the corporation's continual competition with the Ford 
Motor Company bears striking similarities. to the description of the 
rivalry between two divisions of General Motors, Chevrolet and 
Pontiac, as well as to the adversarial relationship between the divi-
sions of the company and their respective dealers. 60 
Specialization not only generates opportunities for unlawful be-
havior by increasing the locations where it might occur, but also by 
obscuring organizational behavior, lawful and unlawful. Task segre-
gation cloaks activities. No one individual or group can command 
all the knowledge pertaining to particular operations, materials, or 
technology. 61 This serves a protective function for the organization, 
increasing its ability to survive despite information leakage or per-
sonnel turnover.62 The secrecy generated by task segregation, how-
ever, also creates the opportunity for misconduct. Specialization 
creates problems of coordination and control. Consequently, organi-
zations develop rules and procedures to handle the various internal 
contingencies the organization faces by specifying how, when, and 
by whom tasks are to be performed.63 The rules and procedures are 
expressed in a language common to all subunits of an organization, 
symbolically integrating the various parts. They seek not only to 
control and coordinate activities, but also to facilitate the systematic 
exchange of information that is necessary for decision-making. 
Though directed toward "integrating the separate parts of the or-
ganization, the potential for rules and procedures to achieve internal 
coordination and control varies considerably. Progressive loss of 
control over subunits seems to be a natural consequence of organiza-
tional growth. Structure interferes with.the efforts of those at the top 
to ''know'' the behavior of the diverse parts by obscuring activity at 
other levels. 64 As the organization grows, and as the distance be-
59. 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETs AND HIERARCHIES 125 (1975); 0. WILLIAMSON, CORPO· 
RATE CONTROL AND BUSINESS BEHAVIOR 47-52 (1970) [hereinafter cited as CORPORATE CON· 
TROL]; Coffee, supra note 58, . at 1135-36; Perrow, The Analysis of Goals in Complex 
Organizations, 26 AM. Soc. Rev. 854 (1961). 
60. J. WRIGHT, ON A CLEAR DAY You CAN SEE GENERAL MOTORS 73-97 (1979). 
61. Technology is used here to encompass operations technology, materials technology, 
and knowledge technology. See Hickson, Pugh & Pheysey, Operations Technology and Organi-
zation Structure: An Empirical Reappraisal, 14 Ao. SCI. Q. 378 (1969). 
62. See D. NELSON, MANAGERS AND WORKERS (1975). 
63. See R. HALL, supra note 35, at 173, 196. 
64. See Gouldner, Reciprocity and Autonom;, in Functional Theory, in SYMPOSIUM ON So-
CIOLOGICAL THEORY 241 (L. Gross ed. 1959); Weick, Educational Organizations as Loosely 
Coupled Systems, 21 AD. SCI. Q. I (1976). 
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tween subordinate units and those at the top likewise grows, "au-
thority leakage,' develops. 65 Authority leakage conveys an image of 
an organization that has, by reason of increased size, hierarchical 
authority system, and specialization, become so unwieldy that the 
upper levels cannot control the subunits. The organization, in short, 
can diversify beyond the capability of those at the top to master it. 
Authority leakage allows an organizational subunit - a subsidi-
ary, the accounting division, or the research and development 
branch, for example - to engage in a fraudulent transaction with 
another organization and ensures that no countervailing intra-orga-
nizational authority can prevent or control the unlawful behavior. 
Specialized knowledge further complicates this problem. In an or-
ganization with highly specialized subunits, one may lack the exper-
tise to detect ongoing violations in another. Interestingly, subgoal 
pursuit and authority leakage may also lead to compliance with legal 
standards in the face of organization pressures to violate. Neverthe-
less, these characteristics also should be considered as factors that 
may generate opportunities for violation. 
Implicit in the concept of authority leakage is that an organiza-
tion should be able to control its subunits. It might be thought, 
therefore, that authority leakage could occur only when an organiza-
tion is operating irrationallY. or ineffectually, and that if a 'firm were 
operating in best form, information would flow smoothly (and accu-
rately) from bottom to top and vice versa, maximiziDB the possibility 
of control. This notion is contradicted by both research and the-
ory. 66 The result that may in some cases be described as inefficient 
or irrational behavior may thus in others be the rational institution-
alization of systematic censorship procedures by those controlling 
the flow of information. 67 
65. Studying governmental bureaucracies in the 1960's, Gordon Tullock observed the 
phenomenon of "authority leakage." He described this as a progressive loss of control 
over subordinate units within the same bureaucracy as the organization expanded and the 
distance between such units and those at the agency's top became greater. Subsequently, 
another student of bureaucracies, Anthony Downs, formalized Tullock's perception into a 
general law, the "Law of Diminishing Control," which states: "The larger any organiza-
tion becomes, the weaker is the control over its actions exercised by those at the top." 
Both Downs and Tullock found one underlying cause of this progressive p!lfalysis to be 
the ease with which generalized orders and nonspecific policies impo~ed at the top could 
be successively reinterpreted, distorted, or qualified as the commands filtered downward 
through the organization. 
Coffee, supra note 58, at 1136-37 (footnotes omitted). See A. DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY 
143 (1966); CORPORATE CONTROL, supra note 59, at 26; G. TULLOCK, THE PoLmcs OF BU-
REAUCRACY 142-93 (1965). 
66. See J. EMERY, ORGANIZATIONAL PLANNING AND CONTROL SYSTEMS 24-48 (1969); 
Coffee, supra note 58, at 1137-39. 
61. See K. ARRow, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 73-75 (1974); C. STONE, supra note 36, 
at 43-44; CORPORATE CONTROL, supra note 59, at 22, 25-26; Coffee, supra note 58, at 1134-47. 
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While authority leakage is a consequence of structure that fo-
cuses attention on the inability of those at the top to control the orga-
nizational bureaucracy, systematic censorship procedures can 
originate at any point in the hierarchy and mask behavior through-
out the organization. Units at the top may thus be encouraged to 
engage in unlawful conduct not only by their structural isolation, but 
also by systematic censorship of information that obscures miscon-
duct from others. Furthermore, the hierarchical authority structure 
diffuses personal responsibility for decision-making throughout the 
organization. Determining where within an organization a decision 
was made is diffi.cult.68 As a result, "[t]he delegation of responsibil-
ity and unwritten orders keep those at the top of the corporate struc-
ture remote from the consequences of their decisions and orders, 
much as the heads of organized- crime families remain 'untouchable' 
by the law."69 
Ill. IMPLICATIONS FOR ENFORCEMENT 
Economic success, competition for scarce resources, norm ero-
sion: and organizational structure and processes provide some in-
sight into how unlawful organizational behavior may be 
systematically produced by the social structure. Not all organiza-
tions will respond with unlawful conduct, 70 but the structural origins 
of misconduct have some interesting implications for social control. 
Many scholars and activists have suggested increasing agency re-
sources to better control unlawful organizational behavior. This sug-
gestion is directed toward strengthening not only sanctions and 
surveillance, but the laws and regulations that undergird the use of 
these technologies. Some suggest, for example, that unlawful organi-
zational behavior be met with sanctions more appropriate to corpo-
rate actors: statutes that impose both organizational criminal 
Coffee points to the Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, which "simply states the much-observed 
phenomenon that recipients of information unconsciously focus on and relay only the infor• 
mation that reinforces their preexisting attitudes, while filtering out conflicting information." 
Id at 1137. See L. FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957); M. ROKEACH, 
THE OPEN AND CLOSED MIND (1960). For more recent revisions of this theory, see I. JANIS & 
L. MANN, DECISION MAKING 15-16, 82-85, 420 n.3 (1977). 
68. For an extended discussion of how this organizational characteristic relates to legal 
issues of responsibility for organizational behavior, see C. STONE, supra note 36, at 60-69. 
69. J. CONKLIN, "ILLEGAL BUT NOT CRIMINAL" 65 (1977). 
70. See Lemert, supra note 5, at 68. Moreover, "[t]he fact that deviance fails to occur 
under these conditions (and occurs when they are absent) merely suggests that structural strain 
is not a necessary and sufficient cause of deviance. To deny the relation between deviance and 
anomie on these grounds would be like arguing that hunger is not causally related to eating 
because people sometimes eat when they are not and refrain from eating when they are." 
Ewick, Memorandum, Feb. 1981 (on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
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liability and personal liability for organizational conduct; statutes 
that more accurately describe organizational violations; greater pen-
alties; prison sentences for corporate executives; federal chartering of 
organizations; variable fines based on gross sales rather than fixed 
amounts; licensing of businessmen so that those licenses can be re-
voked; and elimination of "no contest" pleas.71 Recommendations 
for strengthening surveillance technologies include, for example, in-
creasing the skills, knowledge, and numbers of agency personnel, 
creating laws that require disclosure of certain information on corpo-
rate activities, public representation on boards of directors, and mix-
ing agency monitoring strategies to vary the· timing of surveillance 
for an organization.72 
Any consideration of policies aimed at increasing agency re-
sources should be grounded in realistic expectations for effectiveness. 
Despite increased resources, all social control efforts encounter natu-
ral constraints because of the ways in which the social structure con-
tinuously and systematically generates unlawful organizational 
behavior. Consequently, while increasing resources to strengthen 
surveillance and sanctioning capabilities may result in greater effi-
ciency and effectiveness in a particular case, the social structure per-
petuates the phenomenon. For business firms, profit-maximization is 
a central activity and scarcity will always be a factor. The structure 
of business organizations, their internal environments and the com-
plexity of their daily transactions73 are aspects of modem life that 
provide suitable opportunities for illegality. 
The autonomy and interdependence of agencies and the firms 
they regulate, moreover, will predictably mitigate social control ef-
foi;ts by increasing the probability that the firms' rewards for gaining 
resources will outweigh the perceived cost of pursuing them unlaw-
fully, thus contributing to misconduct.74 The autonomy of corporate 
actors is protected by structure and the nature of business transac-
tions, as well as by notions of privacy, all of which present barriers to 
surveillance of organizational behavior. Specialization reinforces 
this protective barrier by requiring agencies to possess highly techni-
cal knowledge concerning specific industries, organizations, and of-
11. See M. CLINAfU), P. YEAGER, 1. BRISSETTE, D. PETRASHEK & E. HARRIES, supra note . 
l; J. CONKLIN, supra note 69; R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT 
CORPORATION (1976); C. STONE, supra note 36; Geis, supra note 21. 
72. See M. Ermann & R. Lundman, supra note l; R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGJ.\1AN, 
supra note 71; C. STONE SUJJra note 36. 
73. See Vaughan, Transaction Systems and Unlaeful Organizational Behavior, 29 Soc. 
PROBS. (1982). 
14. See D. VAUGHAN, supra note 4, at ch. 6; note 28 supra and accompanying text. 
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fenses to carry out their mandates. And the interdependence of 
government agencies and business firms critically affects the creation 
and use of sanctioning technologies. Possession of a resource critical 
to an exchange affects the behavior of the resource-dependent organ-
ization,75 and when the government is dependent upon a firm for 
some commodity or service, the probability of vigorous enforcement 
is decreased.76 Business firms and agencies frequently compromise, 
both in the creation and application of laws and regulations, for ne-
gotiation requires fewer resources from both than adversarial strate-
gies. Resource exchanges between agencies and business firms also 
influence the effectiveness of restraints. Despite increased resources 
devoted to social control, therefore, organizational misconduct ap-
pears to be a natural accompaniment to the complexity of business 
organizations and their interactions that will continue as long as the 
structure of opportunity and organizational goals remains the same. 
It is important to recognize, finally, that laws and regulations, 
surveillance, and sanctioning may themselves be related to unlawful 
behavior. Increasing these resources to strengthen agency capabili-
ties may have the unintended effect of increasing real rates of unlaw-
ful business conduct, even after accounting for increases from 
greater enforcement activity.77 This· possibility is created in a 
number of ways. 
First, the laws and regulations that prescribe and proscribe the 
behavior of business organizations are a major resource of social 
control agencies. Certain characteristics of these rules may be re-
lated to patterns of violations. For example: 
(1) Number: A proliferation of guidelines related to a particular 
industry, task, or exchange may defy mastery, or result in some regu-
lations being selectively ignored. Large numbers of laws and rules 
moreover, create monitoring difficulties, which reduce the risk of de-
tection and sanctioning. 
(2) Recency: The date of origin may affect the legitimacy of a 
law or regulation, knowledge of its existence, or the degree to which 
it has been tested or officially interpreted. These factors may influ-
ence willingness to conform or deviate.78 
(3) Relevance: The degree to which a law or regulation is rele-
75. J. PFEFFER & G. SALANCIK, supra note I, at 51. 
76. D. VAUGHAN, supra note 4, at ch. 6. 
77. See Marx, Ironies of Social Control· Authorities as Contributors lo Deviance Through 
Escalation, Noneeforcement, and Covert Facilitation, 28 Soc. PRODS. 222 (1981). 
78. Ewick, Theories of Organizational Illegality: A Reconceptualization, 2 Y ALB WORKING 
PAPER SERIES 12 (1981). 
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vant to a particular task or the larger purpos(?s of the organization 
may influence willingness to abide by it.79 
( 4) Complexity: A law or rule having many interrelated parts or 
elements may be difficult to interpret, generating unlawful conduct 
out of misunderstanding. 
. (5) Vagueness: A law or regulation that is stated in general or 
indefinite terms, or that is not clearly expressed may result in 
misconduct. · 
(6) Acceptability: Acceptability of a rule or a law may be influ-
enced by substantive focus, cost of adherence in terms of time, per-
sonnel, and equipment, existence and strength of sanctions invoked 
for violation, predictability of enforcement, or any of the preceding 
five characteristics. so 
Second, the surveillance technologies of social control agencies 
- monitoring and investigating the behavior of business :firms -
may also be related to unlawful conduct. Surveillance subjects an 
organization to accountability. "[T]o hold an organization accounta-
ble is to set up norms or criteria by which its success in goal-attain-
ment is judged."81 Not only may this intensify pressures to attain 
goals, creating tensions to attain them unlawfully, but organizations 
may respond to the surveillance by falsifying the performance in-
dicators being monitored. Surveillance also imposes costs on organi-
zations. Filing, reporting, and_ inspection requirements for 
organizations demand resources that could be directed toward profit-
. maximization or related goals. In the event that surveillance im-
poses costs on organizations that interfere with other survival strate-
gies, it may produce tensions to attain · necessary resources 
unlawfully. 
Third, sanctions that interfere with the attainment of organiza-
tional goals may opera!e similarly. Many sanctions seek to punish 
organizational misconduct by affecting profits. A business :firm that 
incurs handicaps to its profit-making capabilities due to sanctions 
imposed may continue to operate with goals altered to match the 
reduced performance capacity, or may try to maintain its position in 
the competition with reduced resources. In the latter situation, firms 
may experience pressures to engage in unlawful conduct to attain 
goals. 
The cost of surveillance and sanctioning will, of course, have va-
79. See A. COHEN, DEVIANCE AND CONTROL 6 (1966); R. HALL, supra note 35, at 173-77. 
80. A. COHEN, supra note 79, at 16-21. 
81. Gross, supra-note 36, at 63. 
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riable impact on organizations. 82 When costs are in proportion to 
sales or output, the impact will be the same across organizations. 
When costs are fixed, however, some organizations will have greater 
difficulty absorbing them than others. Firms not experiencing eco-
nomic strain and possessing resources to adapt to regulatory strate-
gies may escape the additional competi_tive pressures the social 
control efforts are likely to generate. Firms operating under uncer-
tainty are more vulnerable. While all firms at times may face uncer-
tain conditions, large and wealthy corporations can draw on greater 
resources should this be the case. The costs of surveillance and sanc-
tioning technologies are thus likely to have a greater impact on 
small, new, or struggling firms than on large, established firms that 
can afford to be regulated. The greater the cost relative to net in-
come, the greater the probability of subsequent pressures to attain 
resources unlawfully. 
Fourth, while surveillance and sanctioning may impose costs on 
business firms that precipitate misconduct in exchanges with other 
organizations acting as suppliers, competitors, and consumers, the 
threat of agency interference with business operations may initiate 
unlawful conduct between businesses and the social control organi-
zations. To protect organizational resources, bribery may occur to 
ensure licensing, inspection, or contract relations that are in the 
firm's best interest. 83 
In a number of ways, therefore, the threat and application of sur-
veillance and sanctioning technologies that increase corporate ex-
penditures relative to net costs may produce illegality. While 
strengthening the resources of agencies may result in greater effi-
ciency and effectiveness in a particular case, in the aggregate greater 
regulatory resources may be accompanied by a- rise in the rate of 
misconduct, in spite of the manifest purposes for which these tools 
are created. In his research on nuclear accidents, for example, Per-
row concluded that better regulation is hard to achieve without in-
creasing costs and risking further accidents because of imposed 
complexity.84 This statement also may hold for organizational ille-
gality. Because misconduct appears to be a function of the complex-
ity of organizations, their interactions, and the structures in which 
82. See Zald,-On the Social Control of Industries, 57 Soc. FORCES 79, 85 (1978). 
83. A. BIDERMAN & A. REISS, DEFINITIONS AND CRITERIA FOR A SELECTION OF PROSPEC-
TIVE FEDERAL SOURCES OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIME DATA 37-38 (1979) (National Institute of 
Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance 
Administration). 
84. Wolf, 17ze Accident. at 17zree Mile Island: Social Science Perspectives, Soc. Set. RE-
SEARCH COUNCIL BULL. 33, 58-59 (1979). 
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they operate, a logical extension is that strengthening the resources 
of social control agencies will increase the complexity of the regula-
tory apparatus and thereby increase the possibility of structurally 
produced tensions and opportunities for misconduct. This possibil-
ity underscores the importance of distinguishing between tactics that 
increase the level of surveillance and the likelihood of apprehending 
and sanctioning and tactics that will change the corporate environ-
ment in ways that will reduce the incidence of unlawful behavior. 
If unlawful organizational behavior is systematically produced 
by the social structure, if firms and agencies negotiate a regulatory 
environment that inhibits the imposition of costs for violative behav-
ior, and if efforts to control violations may have the unintended ef-
fect of encouraging them, what remains to be said concerning the 
social control of organizations? Does this mean that social control 
efforts are to no avail and should be abandoned because they only 
succeed in stimulating rates of corporate misconduct? While such a 
policy of radical nonintervention85 may indeed reduce the system's 
complexity and thus alleviate tensions to engage in unlawful con-
duct, agencies' ability to regulate specific corporate behaviors should 
not be overlooked. 86 Any conclusions about nonintervention, there-
fore, are unjustifiable without an accounting of the aggregate mone-
tary and social costs and benefits of social control and of how those 
costs and benefits are distributed. 87 
Some of these are difficult to assess. Recognition that unlawful 
business conduct is a natural accompaniment of modem life, for ex-
ample, should neither obfuscate nor deny the issue of moral respon-
sibility in the individual case. Beyond the question of effectiveness 
and efficiency, investing resources in the social control of organiza-
tions may serve an important societal function by challenging the 
notion of corporations as elite entities beyond the law. Another issue 
is deterrence; little is known about deterrence and corporate actors. 
While it may be true that an accounting of aggregate costs and bene-
fits of social control and their distribution is impractical or even im-
possible, policy should not be structured to preclude the possibility 
that such benefits may occur. 
. Rather than a nonintervention stance reflecting the negative im-
plications that structural constraints pose for the control of unlawful 
8S. See E. SCHUR, RADICAL NONINTERVENTION (1973). 
86. See D. VAUGHAN, supra note 4, at ch. 3. 
87. See Barnett, Corporate Capitalism, Corporate Crime 13-14 (Paper presented at Con-
ference on White Collar and Economic Crime, Potsdam, N.Y., Feb. 7-9, 1980) (on file with the 
Michigan Law Review). 
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organizational behavior, an understanding of these constraints can 
offer some guidelines for positive remedies addressing the structural 
origins of organizational misconduct. Of the generating factors dis-
cussed, the least addressed by scholars and activists, yet perhaps the 
most vulnerable to manipulation by social control agencies, are the 
activities of agencies themselves. 88 Agencies engage in exchange 
with business .firms and establish the guidelines for transactions be-
tween private enterprise organizations. In addition to their man-
dated surveillance activities, agencies can guard against the 
possibility that these regulatory efforts may generate unlawful con-
duct. The simplification of reporting and filing requirements for 
firms, for example, and attention to the characteristics of law and 
regulations that may generate violations are positive directions that 
agency self-surveillance might talce. 
88. One exception is the .work of Gerhart, who analyzes the variables that influence the 
length of antitrust cases and evaluates techniques that have been or might be used to expedite 
antitrust litigation. See P. G!;RHART, 2 REPORT OF THE EMPIRICAL CASE STUDIES PROJECT TO 
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION EOR THE REvlE.W OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES (1979). 
